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THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT: COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In the Matter of the Application of 
MATTHEW HALL, #95-A-4333, 
Petitioner, 
-against-
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
For a Judgment pursuant to Article 78 





Decision, Order and 
Judgment 
.(Suprei;ne Court, Albany County, Special Term, November 21, 2003) 
(Justice Edward A. Sheridan, Presiding) 
APPEARANCES: 
SHERIDAN, J.: 
MA TIHEW HALL, Pro se 
Otisville C01Tectional Facility 
P.O. Box 8 .... 
Otisville, New York 10963 
HON. ELIOT SPITZER 
Attorney General of the State of New York 
(Megan M. Brown, of Counsel) 
Attorney for Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
Petitioner, currently an inmate at Otisville Correctional Facility, brings this special 
proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR, seeldng review of respondent's denial of his 
application for parole following his re~appearance before the Board on June 19, 2002. 
Following petitioner's initial appearance before the Board, parole was denied and 
petitioner was ordered held for twet?-ty four months. At the time of his re-appearance, petitioner had 
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served 94 months of a sentence of six to .eighteen years imposed upon his conviction, by plea, for 
manslaughter in the first degree. At the hearing, petitioner's prior criminal history was briefly noted. 
There was extensive discussion of the instant crime and the circumstances surrounding it. 
Petitioner's institutional programming was noted, and the Board noted that petitioner had "taken all 
the violence programs you can talce". Petitioner stated that he had obtained a GED and an EEC, and 
~ 
I 
his good institutional record (one Tier II ticket incurred shortly after his initial appearance) was 
noted. Co:m,menting 011 petitioner's EEC, the commissioner noted "that doesn't guarantee your 
\ 
. releasp. You understand that? ... That's only o~e piece of it. DOCS knows one piece of it. They 
don't base that on your entire criminal record. They don't base that on the instant offense. You can 
have the most horrific crime, but if you have a sentence that's no more than six years you're still 
eligible for the Earned Eligibility Certificate." Petitioner's residential and employment plans upon 
release were reviewed, and there was further discussion of the facts underlying the instant offense. 
The Board denied petitioner parole release, stating: 
Despite an earned eligibility certificate, parole is denied for the 
following reasons: after a:~eful revie:w of your entj.re record and this . 
interview, it is the determination of this panel that if released at this 
time there is a reasonable· probability thfrt you ,would not live and 
remain at liberty without .violating the law and your release at this 
time is incompatible with the welfare .and safety of the community. 
This decision is based on the following factors: serio.us nature of the 
offense. You are currently · Servi~g ~anslaughter 1st, where you 
became involved in an altercation on the street at approximately 4:00 
A.M. where you stabbed your victim causing his death. You 
demonstrated utter disregard for human life and .safety. Your ciiminal 
record consists oflarcenous offenses with the inst~~ offense a serious 
escalation of your criminal behavior. The panel recognizes your 
prograi:nparticipatio11 and your institu1i.o.nal be,b.avior. However, your 
violent response to this confrontation in the community: deems you a 
poor candidate for discre.tionary relea~e. · 
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Petitioner was ordered held for 24 months. The decision to deny parole was affirmed upon 
petitioner's administrative appeal~ and he commenced this judicial proceeding. 
Petitioner contends that respondent's determination that he would not remain free 
without violating the law is unsupported by the record and is based solely on the serious nature of 
the instant offense and his criminal history. He argues that the reasons set forth for denial are 
?. 
insufficient as a matter oflaw inasmuch as his possession of an Earned Eligibility Certificate at the 
time of his second appearance before the Board required the panei to focus on factors subsequent to 
I 
his cpmmission of the instant cri~e (see ~orrection Law §805; 9 NYCRR §8002.3[b]; (c]). 
Petitioner asserts that the written decision does not comply with Executive Law §259-i(2)( a) because 
! 
it is vague an~ conclusory, irrational, and fails to provide petitioner with guidance regarding what 
rehabilitative steps he may take to earn parole. He further contends that respondent's decision is 
. . 
defective because the panel allowed personal, political and public opinion to enter the deCision-
. . . 
making calculus. H~ also contends that one of the Comrp.issioners on the panel was biased against ~ 
him and biased the other Commissioners with discus~ion of petitioner's appeal from the denial of 
parole after his initial appearance. Respondent asserts that petitioner's claims regarding "political 
influence" and the Commissioner's bias are not properly before the Court, and contends that the 
denial of parole and the 24 month hold was based on a hearing and review of petifton' s file that was 
conducted in accordance with all statutory, constitutional and regulatory requirements, and that the 
determination must therefore be affirmed. 
Within the general statutory guideposts set forth in Executive Law §259-i(l) and (2), 
the Parole Board has wide discretion in deciding whether or not to grant parole release. "So long 
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as the Board violates no positive statutory requirement, its discretion is absolute and beyond review 
in the Courts" (Matter of Briguglio v Board of Parole, 24 NY2d 21, 29, quoting Matter of Hines v 
State Board of Parole, 293 NY 254, 257). The discretionary determination of the Parole Board, if 
made in accordance with the statutes, will not be disturbed absent a showing of error or irrationality 
bordering on impropriety (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 4 70; Matter of Saunders v Travis, 
238 AD2d 688, lv denied 90 NY2d 805, citing Matter of Russo v N.Y.S. Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 
69, 77; Matier of Ristau v Hammock, I 03 AD2d 944, lv denied 63 NY2d 608). 
l 
i Pursuant to the statutes and regulations that govern the Parole Board's determinations, 
a candidate's criminality is a valid factor for the Board to consider (Executive Law §§259-i[l ][a], 
. . 
[2][ c]; 9 NYCRR § 8001 .3). As respondent contends, petitioner's possession of an Earned Eligibility 
Certificate does not preclude the Board from considering his instant and prior offenses (see Matter 
of Cornejo v.New York State Division of Parole 269 AD2d 713; Matter of Herouard v Travis, 250 
AD2d 911; Matter of Jackson v New York. State Division of Parole, 217 AD2d 732; Matter of 
Salcedo v Ross, 183 AD2d 771). However, it was erroneous for the Board to deny parole based 
solely upon the "serious nature of the offense", for two different reasons. 
. . . .... · 
First, to deny parole exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner's crime, even in the 
absence of an EEC, there must have been "some significantly aggravating or egregious 
circumstances surrounding commission of the particular crime" (Matter of King v New York State 
Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 433, affd 83 NY2d 788). Neither the record submitted to the Court 
in this case nor the Board's written decisi9n reveal a factual basis indicating the presence of 
"significantly aggravating or egregious circumstances" surrounding petitioner's commission of the 
4 
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instant crime (compare Matter ofRentz v Herbert, 206 AD2d 944, lv denied 84 NY2d 810 [murder 
in the second degree committed in an "egr~gious" and "gruesome" manner]). 
Second, petitioner's possession of an Earned Eligibility Certificate, while not a 
guarantee of parole release (see Matter of Walker v Russi, 176 AD2d 1185, 1186, appeal dismissed 
79 NY2d 897), creates a presumption in favor of p~ole release (Correction Law §805). As relevant 
here, Correction Law §805 states that petitioner "shall be granted release ... unless the Board of 
Parole determines that there is reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, be will not live 
I 
an? remain at liberty without violating the law and that the release is not compatible with the welfare 
. . 
of society" @). In making this determination, the Board must consider, inter al.ia, "any available 
information which would indicate an inability to live and remain at liberty without violating the law, 
and that the release is incompatible with the welfare of society" (9 NYCRR §8002.3(c][5]). 
Here, the Board's decision recites the.applicable statutory criteria for denying parole ~ 
release, but expressly relies on the serious nature of petitl~ner' s crime and his "violent response to 
a confrontation in the community" as the exclusive rationale for its determination that he would be 
unable to live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is incompatible with 
. . 
the welfare of society. This determination was not reached in compliance with the requirements of 
9 NYCRR §8002.3(c)(5), as the decision does not recite (and the record do~s not reveal) any 
information providing indicia of pe_titioner's inability to live a law abiding life or that his release is 
incompatible with the welfare ·of s.oci~ty.' Cases cited by the respondent for the proposition th~t 
petitioner's serious crime may be considered notwithstanding his possession of an EEC are not ~o 
the contrary, as the records in those cases included significant factors supporting a denial of parole 
5 
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in addition to the serious nature of the instant offense (see Matter of Cornejo [petitioner was serving 
three separate felony sentences, including one for attempted promoting prison contraband in the first 
degree]; Matter ofHerouard, 250 AD2d, at 912 [parole denied "based upon [petitioner's] admitted 
commission of serious crimes while he was on probation following a previous conviction together 
with his failure to express remorse or acknowledge responsibility for his violent crimes, blaming his 
~ 
criminal conduct on 'peer pressure'"]; Matte:r oqackson [decision based µpon "extremely violent" 
nature of petitioner' s crime and his poor institutional disciplinary record]; Matter of Salcedo [Parole 
I 
B$ard decision recited the seriousness of petitioner 's crime, his lack of insight into the danger to 
which he exposed other persons, and his lack of remorse]). 
Moreover, in light of the holding of Krng (supra), it is erroneous for respondent to 
conclude that petitioner's commission of a serious · crime - in the absence of significantly 
aggravating or egregious circumstances -· · indicates that he will not be law abiding in the future or 
that his release is incompatible with the welfare of society. Indeed, in imposing an indeterminate 
sentence within the r~ge authorized by the Legislature, the court that imposed petitioner's sentence 
has already determined that, in the absence of negative factors flowing· from respondent's 
consideration of the enumerated requirements set forth in 9 NYCRR §8002.3(c), release at the 
expiration of petitioner's minimum term would not be incompatible with the welfare of society. 
Petitioner's remaining contentions warrant little discussion. Respondent correctly . . 
contends that petitioner's claim of commissioner bia~ was waived, and that his contentions regarding 
political or other non-statutory influences are not preserved for this Court's review. Petitioner's 
allegation that respondent violated 9 NYCRR §8002.3(b) is without merit because that regulatory 
6 
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provision applies wh~n the minimum period of incarceration was set pursuant to the guidelines, and 
not by the sentencing court. Finally, while the Board's decision must set forth the reasons for denial 
in detail (see Executive Law §259-i[2][ a] [i]), there is no requirement that the Board advise an inmate 
of rehabilitative steps that may be taken to earn parole at a re-appearaµce before the Board, however 
desirable or appropriate that might otherwise be in,, a model indeterminate sentencing structure. 
In sum, resg ondent' s determination to deny parole was not reached in accordance with 
law, and in the absence of record supJ?Ort, it was:rnot rationally based. Accordingly, it is hereby 
I 
ORDERED, that the petition is GRANTED, the determination denying parole is 
annulled, and the matter is remanded to the Board of Parole-for a prompt re-hearing before a new 
panel and a decision not inconsistent with this Court's decision. 
This memorandum shall constitute the Decision, Order and Judgment of this Court. 
All papers, including this Decision, are being returned to respondent's attorney. The 
signing of this Decision shall not constitute entry or filing. Counsel is not relieved from the 
applicable provisions of the CPLR respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
SO ORDERED. 
ENTER JUDGMENT. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
March 4 , 2004 
~«~-/ . Edward A .. Sheridan, AJ.S.C. 
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PAPERS CONSIDERED: 
(1) Order to Show Cause, signed September 2, 2003; 
· (2) Verified Petition, dated August 12, 2003, with exhibits A-D; 
(3) Verified Answer, dated November 3, 2003, with exhibits A-H; 
(4) Affirmation of Megan M. Brown, Esq., dated November 4, 2003; 
(5) Petitioner's Response, dated December 2, 2003. 
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